Portland Copwatch Analyzes Compliance Officer Report on US DOJ Agreement July 2024Table of contentsIntroduction Use of Force Part 1: New Rules on What is Force Ready to Kick In Use of Force Part 2: Same Old, Same Old Training: No Progress on Reporting Force to the Community Mental Health and Crisis Intervention Lapses in Employee Information System Not Reason for Lack of Compliance Accountability is Hardly Ever Heard Community Engagement: Compliance Officer's Team Hears Grassroots Concenrs Other Remedies Underway Conclusion APPENDIX: Dismissed and "Self- Monitoring" Paragraphs Footnotes
To: Compliance Officer/Community Liaison
FINAL COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S REPORT SHOWS NO CHANGE, ANTICIPATING
NEW MONITOR The Compliance Officer/Community Liaison, the consultants who have since 2015 reviewed whether Portland is implementing the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Settlement Agreement of 2012 appropriately, issued their final quarterly analysis on July 1.*-1 The new Report provides information about outcomes of misconduct investigations and observations from the COCL's recently-instituted Community Engagement Team, both of which point to the need for reliable oversight of the Portland Police Bureau. While the City and the DOJ have been lax about many deadlines written into the Agreement, it appears the COCL's contract is ending exactly 30 days after the Monitor's work began on July 1, meaning these comments and any others submitted by July 30 will not influence the final Report. Thus, Portland Copwatch (PCW) urges the parties, Judge Simon, and the new Monitor to read our analysis carefully. We are also including our list of questions and corrections meant for the COCL since those will not be responded to or implemented. As a reminder, the Monitor is only required to report every six months, rather than quarterly, so the next compliance analysis may not be out until December or January, depending whether they publish a Q2/Q3 Report in October or not. The COCL Report weighs in at a relatively short 90 pages, and its main theme is that the Monitor will now have the responsibility to report on the remaining eleven paragraphs which are still not in full compliance. They are: Use of Force Paragraph 69 (about force reporting); Employee Information System paragraphs 116 and 117 about use of the System; Accountability Paragraphs 122, 131, 137, and 169 about concurrent investigations, use of the Police Review Board, the Corrective Action/Discipline Guide, and overall oversight; and New Remedies Paragraphs 189, 192, 194 and 195 about crowd control, investigations into the 2020 protests, body cameras and the new oversight system. There are also 45 other paragraphs which were not dismissed when the Agreement was modified in November 2023 (and entered into the court record on January 26, 2024). The Agreement was put in place because the DOJ found the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) using excessive force against people with mental illness. Notably, they did not find a legal basis to support additional community concerns about PPB force, deadly force and stop data information showing bias against Black people in Portland. The question remains that PCW has asked for many years: how will the community get the inside information currently released in these Reports once the DOJ goes away? Or, for that matter, who will hold the Bureau to account when they don't adhere to the agreed upon remedies? A stark reminder that the system needs outside eyes comes again in the analysis of Paragraph 129, which requires investigations into all allegations of Use of Force. One case that was dismissed apparently included an injury to the community member and should have been investigated [p. 55]. The COCL said this one variation does not make a trend-- even though this is not the first time they've found such a case falling through the cracks-- but that the case should be re-opened. Other interesting tidbits include: --After years of back-and forth, the Bureau finally began presenting information about force/deadly force involving people with mental illness to the Behavioral Health Unit Advisory Committee (BHUAC) in 2023 to comply with Paragraph 95. The 2024 presentation had the details of deadly force cases explained by Homicide Detectives, who only determine whether officers may have violated the law [p. 39]. It's not clear why they would not have Internal Affairs or the Police Review Board coordinator make the presentation, since the BHUAC has the ability-- and responsibility-- to make recommendations about PPB policy and training, but not necessarily about federal or state laws. Notably, when PCW brought this up at the BHUAC's July public meeting, the Lieutenant in charge said he would think about that for next year. --The Bureau stopped putting investigations into possible misconduct on hold when the involved community member faces criminal charges (121) [p. 48]. While PCW expressed concern about this former "tolling" practice, in retrospect it makes sense if the person's criminal attorney wants the misconduct investigation put on hold so that it will not interfere with their client's criminal case. The change occurred in Q2, so the Report doesn't go into much detail. It would be good to know if a request from the community member/their attorney can suspend the investigation so that anything stated regarding the potential criminal charges can't harm them. --There is still no resolution to the four investigations being conducted by the "Independent" Police Review (IPR) into supervisors' actions at the 2020 protests, and no information about why it has taken so long to finish those cases (192) [p. 81]. This is especially worrisome given Chief Day's comment at the April Citizen Review Committee meeting where he questioned whether it even makes sense to discipline officers for actions that happened four years ago.*-2 --Part of the City's remedy for their responses to protests has been to re-open "mutual aid" agreements with the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office and Gresham Police (189) [pp. 78-79]. What's not mentioned in the Report is that the new agreements are for those officers to work patrol to free up Portland Police to respond to protests. The same issue exists for these non-PPB patrol officers as when they helped with crowd control: If they don't receive the same training as PPB officers, particularly de-escalation and mental health training, the community will not receive consistent police response. It's only briefly mentioned that the PPB was involved in one deadly force incident in Q1. On January 14, a PPB sniper shot and killed Matthew Holland, who was shooting up a luxury condo he apparently lived in downtown. The Bureau's news release included a photo of Holland's gun soaked in blood, which seemed inappropriate. But that is of no concern to the Settlement Agreement, only whether the police shooting and police investigation of the police shooting followed the right protocols. As begun above, paragraph numbers appear (in parentheses) and page numbers [in brackets] throughout this document. Here are issues we noted in each section. back to table of contents • back to top USE OF FORCE, PART I: NEW RULES ON WHAT IS FORCE READY TO KICK IN "De Minimis Force": The COCL hints that a remedy has been proposed to a long-time issue they've raised about officers inconsistently reporting whether they use force when handcuffing or "controlling" community members (69) [p. 11]. The Bureau published its draft Directive 910.00 on Force Reporting on July 1, indicating that what is currently known as "Category IV" Force, which includes resistance against handcuffing and control against resistance, is being re-defined. On the positive side, such potentially injurious actions as drawing a firearm and boxing people's vehicles in with police cars are being moved up to Category III. On the negative side, the other force is now being termed "de minimis" and is not required for officers to report as Force. This means that supervisory reviews and data analysis will no longer include information about these intrusions into people's Fourth Amendment rights. At the July Training Advisory Council meeting, the PPB presented a very manipulative video to show how multiple officers wearing body cameras and multiple community witnesses also documenting a scene cost the Bureau a lot of time. They seemed to think the "de minimis force," in this case what appears to be a houseless Black woman having her arms jacked up behind her while she's being put in cuffs, wasted a lot of people's time. The video doesn't adequately explain why the Bureau says that every officer had to spend seven hours reviewing the incident. It sounded as if a lot of it had to do with uploading and/or watching each others' body camera footage, which is not allowed prior to writing reports in more serious force cases. They also reported that the witnesses said they did not see a use of force, likely because they thought that meant strikes, kicks, batons, Tasers, firearms, or other overt violence. However, if a community member were to jack a police officer's arms up behind their back, they would be charged with assault. The Bureau concluded that the concept of "de minimis" force is likely to lead to officers using more of this kind of force earlier on in a confrontation, which they claim will prevent more serious force from being used. But since it won't be recorded in a force report, the community may never know. PCW expresses deep concerns that this change in force categorization moved to the point of implementation (a) without discussion with the community, (b) exactly during the transition between the COCL and the Monitor, and (c) just prior to the institution of the new oversight system, which will have a $14 million budget and could be sent to investigate these incidents to lessen the time spent by PPB personnel. The timing seems deliberate. back to table of contents • back to top USE OF FORCE PART II: Same old, Same old Reporting Updates: The Report's information about the other paragraphs about Use of Force mostly repeats information from previous analyses: Supervisors are doing ok investigating force (70) [p. 20], the After Action Report provides a checklist for such investigations (72) [p. 21], and higher ranking officers' reviews of these investigations are being done (73) [p. 22]. The latter is notable for mentioning how supervisors identify tactical, policy, training and equipment concerns. These are the exact kinds of systemic findings the Police Accountability Commission built into its proposal for the new oversight system, but which the City left out when it drafted City Code for the system. News to Us, Not the Cops: Perhaps this makes sense and it has been reported before, but it stood out in Paragraph 76 that when officers are flagged in the Employee Information System as outliers for use of force they receive notice that the alert has been put out on them [pp. 25-26]. There/Not There: It's not clear whether the Bureau's definition of de-escalation and how they train officers to talk about that tactic have been cleared up, despite several previous recommendations from the COCL. There is no analysis about this problem in the new Report, though the recommendation remains (66/67) [p. 19]. back to table of contents • back to top TRAINING: NO PROGRESS ON REPORTING FORCE TO THE COMMUNITY In short, there is not a lot of new information in the section on Training, where all six remaining paragraphs were found in compliance once more. Audit Again: The COCL again calls for a new audit of the Bureau's training to take place in 2025, three years after the previous one (85) [p. 32]. TAC Wants Better Data: Another issue which has carried over is that the Training Advisory Council (TAC) has been asking the Bureau for some time to change the way reports are written so that they are more understandable and provide them with the data they are interested in. The PPB claimed that the COCL and DOJ did not want the reports changed in any way, but in a previous Report the COCL made it clear that new items can be _added_ to those reports, they just can't take anything out. The new Report hints that discussions between the TAC and the Bureau may help in the future, but doesn't encourage them to fix the reports in a timely way (86) [p. 33]. In fact, as we noted in our previous analysis, a PPB representative repeated that they were unable to change their reporting at a TAC meeting in Q1-- the scope of this new Report. Perhaps the new Monitor can exert more influence to get the Bureau to meet community needs and increase transparency. Community Involvement?: Paragraph 79 on the Training Plan says the Bureau checked eleven sources to work on their plan, but no longer clearly urges them to take more input from the community [p. 28]. Avoiding Community Input: Once again the Report refers to Executive Orders that are guiding police policy, as well as Standard Operating Procedures, without detailing what the content was (81) [p. 29]. These items are not necessarily posted for the public to read and are definitely not part of the standard process of reviewing policies before they are enacted. The Bureau and the city claim transparency is an important value. There is no reason we know of why these items should not be easily accessible to the public. back to table of contents • back to top MENTAL HEALTH AND CRISIS INTERVENTION Only seven paragraphs remain in these two sections, and all have been found in Substantial Compliance. Agree to Disagree (for seven years): The COCL continues to say that the Unity Center functions as the drop-off center envisioned in Paragraph 89 [p. 35]. But the center is supposed to include a walk-in component for the community to access services. The powers-that-be continue to blame police violence against people with mental illness on the lack of services instead of on actions by police. There must be a bigger push for true options for care so that the police will stop using that excuse when they harm and kill people. Again, remember that force against people in crisis is why the DOJ Agreement exists. Mental Health Expertise Still Not Helping: As noted above, the Behavioral Health Unit Advisory Committee heard from the PPB about force and deadly force cases involving people in mental health crisis. They did not talk about the content of the presentation at their April public meeting because, they said, the minutes had not been published. They also did not talk about it at the July meeting, although the minutes had been published, but not the video as promised. While these discussions about the March meeting did not occur in Q1, the COCL does not note (in Paragraph 95) [p. 39] that the BHUAC asked questions about the Police Review Board process which the Homicide Detective was unable to answer and/or answered incorrectly. The BHUAC was told that the PRB process is entirely confidential, even though reports about the meetings are posted publicly, and that they were unsure how to track the recommendations made by the PRB, even though those are also included in the reports. PCW had to inform the BHUAC of these facts, and had to wait until July to do so because the BHUAC's regular meetings are closed to the public. Quorum Improvements: Paragraph 94 [p. 38] says the BHUAC was able to meet quorum in all three Q1 meetings, unlike Q4 (1/2) and Q3 (2/3). More importantly, the BHUAC discussed its bylaws in February about designating representatives to temporarily replace members who cannot make meetings and allowing electronic voting (96) [p. 40]. If these ideas have been adopted it may greatly help BHUAC get more work done. Dangling Modifiers: The BHUAC had asked the Bureau in Q3 to include Portland Street Response (PSR) and calling 988 (the mental health line) in their policies, but that does not seem to have happened and the COCL has not followed up on the issue. Dis-functional: As noted in our last analysis, the DOJ and the City disagree about whether Crisis Triage is fully functional in Portland (115) because of the uncertainty around the PSR program. The COCL continues to find that paragraph in substantial compliance [pp. 41-42]. Slightly good news: After dropping by about 1/3 to under 3000 calls in Q4, PSR only had 44 fewer calls in Q1. back to table of contents • back to top LAPSES IN EMPLOYEE INFORMATION SYSTEM NOT REASON FOR LACK OF COMPLIANCE The Big Question: The data shared in the COCL's Q4 Report showed great disparities in how officers who had multiple sustained complaints receiving counseling (or not). However, the reason the COCL continues to find Paragraphs 116 and 117 out of compliance only has to do with whether the System itself is adequate to identify potential problem officers. The COCL previously indicated that the parties (ie, the City and the DOJ) needed to make that decision, but now says it will be up to the Monitor to decide [pp. 43-44]. What Experience?: PCW continues to express concern that there have been at least seven Force Inspectors in the course of seven years. We wonder how they can lean on their "experience" to help determine when a threshold of a certain number of complaints or uses of force sets off an alert in the EIS system which needs follow up. If there's a more stable set of staff people, such as analysts or even the Inspector General, that argument makes more sense, but with so much turnover, the subjective decision making is bound to be inconsistent. back to table of contents • back to top ACCOUNTABILITY IS HARDLY EVER HEARD Ten of the fourteen paragraphs remaining in the section on Accountability remain in Partial Compliance. Which is not to say that Portland Police are consistently being held accountable for misconduct, only that what's written in the Settlement Agreement has mostly been implemented in one way or another. Side note: PCW's comment in Q4 that there would be no review of pending retaliation cases because Paragraph 130 was dropped from the Agreement proved to be true. Not only is there no mention in the Q1 Report, but the responses from the COCL to community comments from Q4 didn't even take note of this concern. Two Justice Systems: As noted above, Paragraph 122 was impacted by the Bureau putting investigations on hold during criminal investigations of community members. These are usually short periods of time where criminal charges for police are considered by a grand jury, but almost never filed.*-3 The time that takes was properly being "tolled," but criminal cases for community members last much longer (in our unfair justice system). It's not clear if the change in tolling is why the COCL now says 90% of cases are investigated within 180 days (121) [pp. 48-49]. SNAFU: In Paragraph 123, which is in Substantial Compliance, we learn that some cases went over the 180 day deadline due to "administrative oversights," training division analysis (presumably a delay in their completing said analysis), and data entry errors [p. 50]. This is all quite alarming, especially 12 years into the implementation of the Agreement. Secret Policy Change: The exception for witness officers to be interviewed after a deadly force incident if they are dealing with emotional trauma continues to be in a non-public Standard Operating Procedure rather than a public-facing Directive. The COCL had urged the Bureau to update the Directive for years but accepted the SOP, leaving the community in the dark (126) [p. 53]. In Compliance But Not Compliant; Once again, officers involved in deadly force cases were asked to walk through the scenes but refused, so the COCL finds Paragraph 127 in Substantial Compliance though the end result is no contemporaneous interviews [pp, 54-55]. Two Accountability Systems: Disturbingly, one of the points of Paragraph 128 is to make sure there is not redundant investigation being done by the IPR and Internal Affairs. However, the City's proposed code for the new oversight system leaves in place that some cases will be investigated by the civilian staff of the new Board and that IA will investigate others, creating a two part system. When the COCL suggests examining how the new system works [p. 55] they should support the Police Accountability Commission's recommendation that all cases involving community members be investigated by the new system to reduce confusion and duplication of effort. Not All Force Investigated (continued): In addition to the case mentioned above that slipped through the cracks without investigation despite an injury due to officer use of force, the COCL says that in two other cases there was a person with a pre-existing injury (which doesn't preclude that the police may have exacerbated that injury) and witnesses did not see force used [p. 55]. As noted in the above report-back on the Training Advisory Council meeting, witnesses tend to think about force as punches, kicks or uses of weapons. It's not clear that they are being asked about lower level force that's now being re-categorized. More Review Board Lapses: In another ongoing issue, the COCL observed a Police Review Board held on a deadly force case where the Board members did not seek justification for each of several officers' multiple gunshots (131) [p. 57]. While we can hope the new system will improve such lines of inquiry, the new Board will also meet behind closed doors and the community may not even learn the nature of the hearings. Ongoing Irritation: The ability of the PRB to send cases back for further investigation has never been used and is embedded only in a Bureau Directive, not the City Code creating the PRB. There will be no more PRBs, probably, by the end of 2025, so maybe it's a moot point, but it's still irritating (132). City Bucks Jury: Because it happened in Q2, the Compliance Officer does not address the civil judgment of over $1 million against the City for the incident in which Officer Curtis Brown shot and killed Michael Townsend, who was in mental health crisis in 2021. They advise the Monitor to review whether subsequent investigation was conducted into the case (133) [p. 58]. The December 2022 Police Review Board report on that incident indicates there was support for the officer's actions but concern about the protestors who showed up after Townsend was killed. The City has reportedly decided to appeal the jury's decision, instead of admitting their officers still use too much force against people in mental health crisis.*-4 They also stated that even if Officer Brown had Enhanced Crisis Intervention Training, the end result would probably have been the same, raising the question of whether the ECIT is effective. Another Community Bypass: The Bureau asked for input into the Directive on the Discipline Guide (now ("Corrective Action Guide") in January 2022. In February, 2022, the Portland Police Association and the City agreed on a new Guide. The COCL notes that in Q1 2024, Paragraph 137 on the discipline Guide was still not in full compliance after two years. However, the Directive (338.00) was updated and posted in June 2024, based on comments made a month before the new Guide was published, thus cutting out the public's ability to comment properly. Furthermore, the online version links to a letter about the old Guide with a cover letter signed by Chief Mike Reese in 2014. The Nature of Misconduct Investigations: The COCL has included outcome data for the accountability system [pp, 62-66]. It shows that: --About 21% of complaints come from PPB employees, while the other 79% come from the community. --Out of 547 allegations investigated over a one year period, the highest ranking categories are Procedure (207 allegations/38%), Conduct (151/28%) and Force (121/ 22%), though 31% of complaints in Central Precinct are for Use of Force. --The most common Directives which may have been violated are Use of Force (127/23%),*-5 Satisfactory Performance (101/19%) followed by Courtesy, Laws- Rules-and-Orders, and Searches. About 3/4 of the Laws/Rules allegations came from Central Precinct, and only one came from North. --Only 35% of complaints receive full investigation, while a whopping 42% of cases get closed (dismissed). About 12% are investigated informally by supervisors, and 11% are just referred to Precincts for informational purposes. Only one case went to mediation. --As far as findings, 35% (50) had "Not Sustained" (insufficient evidence) findings, 31% (44) were "Exonerated" (in policy), 23% (33) were "Unfounded" (incident did not happen as alleged) and only 15 allegations, or 11%, were "Sustained" (officer violated policy). Accountability is such a lonely word. --The most commonly sustained findings were for procedure (43%), conduct (28%) and force-- a mere 4%. One Disparate Treatment (aka racial profiling) allegation was sustained-- a true rarity in the decades Portland Copwatch has been around. --The COCL includes data on how many officers received one (176) or more (31) complaints, but strangely does not include a table breaking down how many had two, three, four or five. The text indicates that only one officer had four and two had five. back to table of contents • back to top COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S TEAM HEARS GRASSROOTS CONCERNS While PCW still would argue that the Portland Police are not substantially engaging with the people of Portland, nor are their data on traffic stops being used to improve relationships, the entire Community Engagement section is once again fully found compliant with the Agreement. That said, the COCL's Engagement Team made reports back which indicate they really listened to grassroots Portlanders. Community Committee Chugs Along: The Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing (PCCEP) met the Compliance Officer's approval by holding two full meetings and five subcommittee meetings in Q1. There is still a note about recruiting more youth members, the seats on the PCCEP with arguably the highest turnover rate (141-143) [pp. 67-68]. It's still apparent, to PCW, though not to the COCL, that the 13- member committee would be able to accomplish more if they had more than 1.75 staff assigned to them (144) [p. 69]. (PCW also still disagrees that the notes from PCCEP meetings can be "easily" found on the City's hard-to-navigate website.) Stops Data Shift: The COCL does not discuss the stops data from Q4 in this Report because they did so in Q4, however they also did not discuss the Q1 stops report or the 2023 Annual Report (both released in Q2). The COCL continues to encourage community dialogue with the Bureau about the data, though the venue for such discussion is unclear (148) [pp. 70-71]. Readers of this analysis should know that the Annual Report includes the admission by the PPB (finally!) that comparing the stops made by the Focused Intervention Team (FIT) to the crime rate is not an appropriate benchmark. In other words, even if you believe that 17% of people involved in accidents in Portland (which has a 6% Black population) are Black, that doesn't explain why over 40% of the FIT's stops are of Black people. We hope the Monitor will conduct more follow up on the disparate numbers, which have persisted since the year 2000 when data collection began. Yes, nearly a quarter of a century. More Problems with Annual Report: Again, this Report covers Q1, so it's strange that the COCL said that the PCCEP would discuss the PPB's 2023 Annual Report draft (140) [p. 71] . In fact, that group declined to do so because the Bureau did not give them enough time to go over the draft and make meaningful comments. The PPB's artificial timeline (which has nothing to do with the presentation to City Council before September required by Paragraph 193) is cutting into its meaningful community engagement. The Report was released in Q2 and the required precinct meetings are underway as PCW writes this analysis; we will follow up in our response to the first Monitor Report. What the Engagement Team Found: The COCL Community Engagement Team has only existed since Dr. Tom Christoff took over the role of Compliance Officer in 2023. The report on their activities in the last year [pp. 73-76] is telling. --They held eight events with organizations, focusing on "groups most likely to experience negative interactions with law enforcement nationwide." --Their outreach included churches, nonprofit organizations, and schools. --They found that people wanted more direct connections with officers, who themselves should look like the community they serve. ---People wanted to see more use of Portland Street Response and better interactions with people with mental illness. --They expressed concern that officers are not being held accountable, and that the new oversight system is being set up for failure. The COCL writes that people are concerned the City Code language compromised the work of the Police Accountability Commission and undermined the intent of Portland voters. --People in the Black and Latino communities who knew more about the Settlement Agreement felt it is not responsive to their experiences. --The COCL team heard and repeated that the new Monitor should build trust and be proactive in engaging the community. Listen, as well as talk. back to table of contents • back to top The four sections in the "Other Remedies" section that was added in 2022 which are still not found in compliance are: __Paragraph 189 requiring outside review of the 2020 protests and revised training and policies --The report submitted by the Independent Monitor, LLC (IMLLC) group in Q3 2023 was followed up by a city self- assessment of its implementation. The IMLLC has yet to put out a follow up report [pp. 78-79]. Notably the IMLLC recommended that the Chief introduce the new Public Order Team to the community, but instead the Chief (a) renamed the team back to what it was called when it caused major problems in 2020, the Rapid Response Team, (b) told the PCCEP he would consider the best way to introduce the Team to the public, and (c) then, with no community member or PCCEP engagement, put together a hastily assembled news conference eight days after talking to the group-- and less than 24 hours after members of PPB and the Mayor's staff were in attendance at a second PCCEP meeting discussing crowd control. __Paragraph 192 requiring IPR to investigate supervisor actions during the 2020 protests
--Addressed in the intro, these investigations into incidents which took place nearly four years ago
are far past the 180 day timeline required in Paragraph 121, even starting from when the Agreement
was amended in April 2022. __Paragraph 194 requiring the Bureau to equip officers with Body Worn Cameras --There was no follow up to the lack of community evaluation of the pilot project that took place in Q3/Q4 2023. The COCL notes the cameras will be rolled out this summer, they are receiving monthly updates, and the Monitor will need to assess the program [pp. 83-84]. __Paragraph 195 requiring the City to establish the oversight system set in the City Charter --The COCL notes that the bargaining with the Portland Police Association (and Portland Police Commanding Officers Association) was finished in Q2. Supposedly, amendments to the agreement were "recently" shared with the US DOJ (around July 1 when this Report was published) [p. 85]. The City Council approved a draft of that document in November 2022 though there was no discussion before the Council deliberations and vote. It is not clear whether the community's first chance to comment on changes to the Accountability section will take place in Judge Simon's courtroom on August 29. It would seem wise for the City to ask for that feedback sooner rather than later. --Q3 2024 UPDATE: The City released its draft code in late June and held a meeting on July 15. They made a few impressive changes receptive to community input, but others which reflect too much influence by police actors. Fifteen of the final 19 members of the PAC submitted a letter to the City ahead of the meeting.*-6 The City invited more comments until July 22, when 13 former PAC members sent a follow up letter.*-7 Side note: Early in the Report, the COCL refers to the new "civilian dean of training" as the Police Education Director. However, later they use the acronym PCW has cautioned against since day one: Director of Police Education, or DOPE. Someone should fix this. back to table of contents • back to top PCW wistfully submits this final analysis of a Compliance Officer/Community Liaison Report while also looking forward to analyzing Reports from the new Court Monitor. We hope they will continue to reveal information the community needs to know but otherwise cannot access, and perhaps more deeply scrutinize whether the spirit of the Agreement is being met, beyond the letter. back to table of contents • back to top APPENDIX: Dismissed and "Self- Monitoring" Paragraphs (as printed in the Q4 2023 analysis by PCW)
The 40 paragraphs that were dismissed and thus not covered in the Report are: These are the 15 paragraphs the City is supposed to now be self-monitoring: (Mental Health) 88, 89, 90, (Crisis Intervention) 94, 95, 96, (Community Engagement) 141, 142, 143, 144, 151, 152, 148, 150, (Other Remedies)193 --------- back to table of contents • back to top *1- Find the Report at https://www.portlandcocl.com/s/Public-Draft-Q1-2024-COCL-Compliance-and-Outcome- Assessment-Report.pdf . *2- https://efiles.portlandoregon.gov/Record/16867049/ *3- in the last 30 years only three officers have been indicted for on duty use of force, and only one for a deadly force case. That was where Officer Dane Reister shot William Monroe with a live round from a less lethal shotgun, and ended when Reister took his own life. The second involved Officer Scott Groshong hitting a person suspected of shoplifting with his patrol car during the 2020 protests; Groshong had already retired when he was convicted. The third was Corey Budworth, the Rapid Response Team member who angrily hit journalist Teri Jacobs in the head with a baton; they entered into a procedural justice agreement where Budworth "apologized" and charges were dropped. *4- Though notably the DOJ's initial findings and comments since the Settlement Agreement went into effect indicate that they aren't concerned about overuse of _deadly_ force. *5- It's not clear why there are 121 force allegations shown in one place and 127 in another.
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https://pdfhost.io/v/yR0lbBiS._formerPACfollowup072224_2
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Posted July 24, 2024 |
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