Portland Copwatch Analyzes Compliance Officer Report on US DOJ Agreement May 2024

To: Compliance Officer/Community Liaison
US Department of Justice
cc: Hon. Judge Michael Simon
City of Portland
Mark P. Smith and Associates
Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing
AMA Coalition for Justice and Police Reform and other community organizations
News media

COMPLIANCE REPORT ON REMAINING US DOJ REQUIREMENTS REVEALS MORE CITY MESS-UPS
an analysis by Portland Copwatch, March 14, 2024

On May 15, Federal Judge Michael Simon is expected to approve of the team nominated to act as Independent Monitor for the 2012 Settlement Agreement between the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the City of Portland. That team will begin work in June or July, and they are only expected to publish Reports on compliance with the Agreement once every six months. Meanwhile, the Compliance Officer/Community Liaison (COCL) published a draft Report on the fourth quarter of 2023..*-1 Although there will be an adjustment from quarterly to semi-annual Reports, Portland Copwatch (PCW) is hoping the COCL is contracted to conduct at least one more review so that there is not a nine-month gap in oversight.

Because the new draft Report only focuses on the 56 paragraphs that were not dismissed when the Agreement was amended in November, it is shorter than usual and contains even less of a focus on police interactions with people who live with mental illness. That is in part because a large number of related paragraphs are no longer under review by the DOJ, and thus, will never even be considered by the Monitor... even if the City backslides on them.

As usual, the Report is a mixture of excusing mediocre police adherence to reform, calling out alarming apparent violations, and other inside tidbits the community would otherwise never know.

Here are some highlights, which PCW details in a longer analysis, below.

--Although Bureau policy and the Agreement allow investigations of officer use of deadly force to be halted until the officers have been cleared of criminal wrongdoing (we say "cleared" because there has only been one indictment in the last 50 years), those investigations have also been being stopped when the community member lives and faces criminal charges (122) [pp. 58-59]. The process of putting the investigations on hold is called "tolling."

--Of the 17 officers who faced the most complaints (between eight and 17 each), only six received any kind of counseling. One who was counseled did not have any sustained findings of misconduct. This illustrates something that the community and rank-and-file police have said for years-- that not every officer is treated the same [pp. 53-56].

--In the last five years, 43% (13 of 30) of the strikes and kicks officers used against people with mental illness took place in 2023 [p. 19].

--The investigations are ongoing into whether supervisors violated policy or training, leading to many complaints, lawsuits and over 6000 uses of force against protestors in 2020. The protests began almost exactly four years ago when George Floyd was murdered. The "Independent" Police Review was charged with investigating the supervisors in April 2022. Investigations are supposed to take under 180 days, but it has been over two years (192) [pp. 83-84].

Overall, the Report is slightly easier to read with its shorter length and increased use of outcomes analysis. However, paragraph 148 regarding collection of traffic stop data merely prompts another suggestion from the COCL for the community and the police to dialogue about the disparities in race revealed in those data, with no expectation that the overpolicing of Portland's Black community will change and no analysis of the reasons behind them [pp. 75-76]. To be fair, the Bureau only has to collect the data to be in compliance, but that is a poor excuse for the numbers continuing to be so out of balance year after year.

Quick update: Though PCW gave praise to the COCL for publishing lawsuit payout data (for the first time in nine years of analysis), they did not modify the Q3 Report to contain anything other than the average payouts per case.*-2

The Q3 Report stated that 13 paragraphs were not in Substantial Compliance, That number is down to 11, because three paragraphs moved up (76, 126 and 128) and the one relating to concurrent investigations of criminal and administrative issues (122) went down due to the "tolling" issue noted above.

The Report is a little confusing, though, because it does not contain a list of which paragraphs were dismissed. PCW has inserted that information throughout this analysis with a full list attached at the bottom.

Significantly, the COCL's analysis of Paragraph 195, which states that the City has to implement the Community Board for Police Accountability as embedded in the City Charter, is only one paragraph long and notes that the City was, at the time the Report was published on April 23, still in negotiations with the police "union" about the Board. This may have changed but we are awaiting information about why this item is on the Council Agenda for May 22.

There is little discussion of the two deadly force cases that took place in Q4, those of Isaac Seavey and Tyrone Johnson II just weeks apart in December. PCW noted that while full implementation of Paragraph 194 about Body Cameras is pending, the police shot two people before the pilot project in 2023 (Jack Watson and PoniaX Calles), and two more after the pilot ended, so none were caught on camera. They have also shot and killed two people in 2024 so far, also without body cameras.*-3

Note that some of this analysis was influenced by a discussion at the Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing (PCCEP) Town Hall about the Report held on May 1.

As above, paragraph numbers in the body of our analysis will generally appear in (parentheses) with Report page numbers in [brackets].

back to table of contents • back to top

USE OF FORCE: STILL PROBLEMS THOUGH BUREAU ALLEGEDLY IN NEARLY FULL COMPLIANCE

(Note: Paragraphs 68 about Taser use and 71 about having an adequate number of Sergeants were dismissed, leaving 10.)

In our last analysis, PCW expressed concern that the Compliance Officer had found the entire section on Use of Force in "Substantial Compliance." That was not correct, as Paragraphs 69 about reporting force and 76 about identifying officers or units who use more force than others were still only in Partial Compliance. PCW regrets the error. That said, the COCL found paragraph 76 in compliance with the implementation of a new Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which guides the Force Inspector on how to identify such officers. Looking at how those officers were addressed in the Employee Information System (EIS) section in the Q2 report, where outlier officers rarely got counseling,*-4 it seems that the City is not really taking its role in reining in problem officers properly. More about other kinds of outlier officers below in the EIS analysis.

Here are other standouts from the Q4 report on force.

--Just like in Q3, even though the COCL reviewed 20 random sample cases and found officers seem to be unclear on the definition of "de-escalation," Paragraphs 66 and 67 were found in full compliance [pp. 10-11]. As PCW wrote before, the Bureau uses separate terms: "Proactive De- escalation" and "Reactive De-escalation" (Directive 1010.00). While it would make more sense to call the latter "mitigation of force," we hope the COCL will encourage the Bureau to use these terms consistently .

--Officers providing reports on Use of Force appear to be confused about when "control against resistance" and "resisted handcuffing" have to be reported (69). The COCL recommends the Bureau should update their Force policy and training and then hold officers accountable in the future if they still don't follow the rule [p. 12]. The officers currently mis-reporting are, it seems, untouchable.

--In Q3 the COCL said that paragraph 73 about After Action Reports had improved, but listed subparagraph lettering (B, C and F) without explanation. This time they say there were investigations and reviews of policy, training, tactical and equipment concerns [pp. 13-14]-- the content of subsection (F). However there was no note about supervisors being disciplined for inaccurate or incomplete reports or analysis (subsections B and C).

--Similarly, they noted improvements in paragraph 77 about chain of command reviews of reports in subsections B, E and G. Subsection B on checking reports for accuracy is reportedly happening 99% of the time. It's not clear that subsection E on noting tactical issues for debriefings and entering them into the EIS, or subsection G on notifying the Professional Standards Division of misconduct, are improved [pp. 15-16]. However, the use of After Action Reports to identify misconduct is mentioned in the Accountability section [p. 66].

--The COCL notes that concerns identified by the Force Inspector led to training on box-ins and ramming of cars (74, 75, 77) [pp. 15-16].

--Though the Force Inspector is supposedly identifying officers who use more force than others, the Bureau's SOP is written to pull out "statistical noise" (76) [pp. 17-18]. Perhaps some of that noise is community members complaining about the pain caused by even what's considered "minor" use of force.

The Force section concludes with four pages of analysis of outcomes [pp. 18-21]. Here are issues PCW identified with this analysis.

--The data show that 16-18% of people who are subjected to force are people with mental illness, and that most of the force (about 70%) is "low level." However there is no comparison to whether those same data hold true for people who are not living with mental illness.

--The reasons for mental health calls leading to force used to have "assist" as the fifth highest reason, now that was replaced with "suspicious," which says something about the state of our city. There's a separate category for "unwanted," which had the same number of calls in 2023 as "suspicious."

--Despite PCW's earlier protestations, people are listed as being armed with "needle, spit or bodily fluid," with 20% of people having such "weapons." This pumps the armed persons up to 44% of contacts.

--Disturbance accounted for 20% of calls in 2023 but only 3% of calls from 2019-2023, meaning 56% of all such calls were reported in 2023.

--CEWS (Tasers) are used in about 3% of force applications on people with mental illness, again not compared to the overall rate... and perhaps it never will be, with the section about Tasers having been dismissed from the Agreement.

back to table of contents • back to top

TRAINING: COPS LIKE COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT THE LEAST

(Note: Paragraphs 80 on keeping training data, 82 on generating quarterly reports, 83 restricting who can be a trainer and 87 requiring Training Advisory Council meetings to be public were dismissed, leaving six)

In their analysis of the training section outcomes [pp. 28-33], the COCL noted that there were more negative responses to Community Engagement training than any other kind, with 16% of officers having negative views while other types had fewer or zero negative reviews. The raw number was only 26 officers, but that still seems like something to be concerned about. A separate chart shows that over 50% did not think the Community Engagement training was important. Both in the Report and at the PCCEP Town Hall, the Compliance Officer dismissed concerns because Community Engagement is supposedly taught in other classes so it was more that the officers felt it was repetitive to have a separate training. At the May 8 Training Advisory Council (TAC) meeting, the group heard from Chief Day about wanting to transform the relationship between police and the community... and then their team looking at curriculum advised moving Community Engagement to the end of the training. This should be of great concern.

Also of concern: 25% of officers with Enhanced Crisis Intervention Team (ECIT) training said they would not go to an ECIT call unless requested to do so.

Here are comments on the analysis of what remains of the Training section:

--The COCL notes again as part of Paragraph 85 about auditing training that there should be more community involvement in deciding what training is prioritized [p. 28]. However, that comment really should be directed at Paragraph 79 about the annual training plan, which lists a myriad of sources from which to gather input but only mentions the TAC and not the community at large [p. 23].

--In Paragraph 81 requiring the tracking of training, the Report mentioned that there were four updates related to new Directives (policies) and Executive Orders [p . 25]. Since Executive Orders are not required to go through the same process as other Directives, the COCL should spell out the content of those and call for them to be formalized with community input. The Bureau expanded its timeline to release officer names after deadly force incidents from one day to two weeks by the fiat of an Executive Order, with no community input sought for roughly a year.

--The quarterly Use of Force Reports that are required to be shared with the Training Advisory Council (86) were not given in Q4 as discussions went on about how to generate more meaningful reports for the community. The COCL made it clear that while the current information needs to remain in the report, there is no objection to the Bureau adding more data tables at the request of the TAC. Yet, at the presentation in Q1 [mentioned on pp. 28-29] the presenter seemed to repeat the previous assertion that due to agreements with the DOJ and COCL the Bureau can't change the reports AT ALL. The TAC Task Force working on the issue said the Council put the question on hold awaiting appointment of the Court Monitor. However, this discussion has dragged on for a year-- or more, if you count TAC's requesting more explanation of why so many Black people are subjected to force by the PPB. The COCL has been suggesting that the Bureau make the presentations more meaningful for the TAC, but needs to explicitly direct them to listen to the TAC's input... as required by the Agreement.

back to table of contents • back to top

THE HEART OF THE AGREEMENT: MENTAL HEALTH AND CRISIS INTERVENTION

(Note: 21 paragraphs were dismissed from the Crisis Intervention (CI) section: 91 creating the Behavioral Health Unit, 92 requiring the use of data, 93 on tracking outcomes, 97/98 about training all officers on CI, 99 on reflecting the Memphis CI model, 100 saying officers can volunteer as part of the ECIT, 101 limiting who can be on ECIT, 102 requiring extra ECIT training, 103 that ECIT officers get activated during their normal duties, 104 to highlight ECIT's work, 105 tracking ECIT data, 106 creating Mental Health Response Teams [MHRT], 107 MHRTs consist of an officer and a mental health professional, 108 limiting who can be on MHRT, 109 requiring extra MHRT training, 110 tracking MHRT data, 111 policies on transferring people in crisis, 112 on the Service Coordination Team, 113/114 outlining Emergency call center policy requirements and training.)

Recalling that the DOJ found in 2012 that Portland Police had a pattern and practice of using too much force on people in mental health crisis, it is concerning that so much of the Crisis Intervention section was dismissed. This becomes more concerning looking at the outcome data presented on pages 44-47. Calls where the ECIT are dispatched and then the call is cleared went down from 66% to 49%, raising the question of whether now is the time to take the proverbial training wheels off. The PPB also said that mental health calls which did not result in dispatching ECIT went up from previous levels of 9%-19% to 25% this quarter-- with no explanation.

Overall, ECIT response has gone down over the years and is now at 67% overall, with North Precinct still lagging at 61% (which is an improvement, COCL notes, from 53% previously).

Also, with no explanation, data show that these specially trained officers are twice as likely to bring people to jail rather than to treatment, which flips both expectations and earlier numbers (though the data tables seem to indicate ECIT officers still were also more likely to jail people in mid-2020, mid-2021).

To the remaining three paragraphs of the Mental Health section:

--PCW continues to agree with the Mental Health Alliance that referring to the Unity Center, operating since 2017, as the walk-in/drop off center envisioned in Paragraph 89 [p. 37] does not reflect the reality of community needs. As Multnomah County struggles to open new facilities in a stable way, the situation may soon change.

--Therefore, the assessment that the whole section is in Substantial Compliance (88) [p. 36] continues to seem too generous. If the PPB doesn't have adequate places to take or to direct people, the situation hasn't improved.

--It's also strange that one of the community groups on mental health had a presentation from the Sunshine Division (90) [pp. 38-39], a quasi-independent project of the PPB that brings food to needy families. Is there a mental health nexus or was this just a means of self-promotion?

...and the four remaining paragraphs on Crisis Intervention (we only address three here):

--Only one of two supposedly monthly meetings (meaning there should have been three) of the Behavioral Health Unit Advisory Committee (BHUAC) had a quorum present to conduct business (94) [p. 40]. In Q3 the group canceled a meeting due to "low availability." The COCL keeps suggesting that they expand the membership or allow alternates to sit on the Committee [p. 42], but as with repeated requests to hold their meetings in public, the BHUAC seems to be ignoring outside advice (see next item).

--Regarding the requirement for the BHUAC to advise the Bureau on policies related to people living with mental illness (95), though they did request adding Portland Street Response and the 988 mental health crisis line into Bureau policy in Q3, there is no update. Furthermore when the Directive in question was posted for public input, the BHUAC's recommendation was not listed among the feedback received by the Bureau. The BHUAC did make recommendations about a dashboard for crisis calls [p. 41]. In Q1, the BHUAC received presentations about deadly force cases. The only recommendation they have made based on last year's presentation-- that we know of-- is adding someone with mental health expertise to the Police Review Board for deadly force incidents. But that doesn't contribute to the prevention of these tragedies, as the Board hearings are held after the shootings occur. The
BHUAC has published the minutes of its 2024 meeting and it reveals that they asked questions about whether ECIT officers were involved in the three cases that were presented. The answer was yes to all three incidents where PPB deadly force was used. The Committee seems to have stopped short again of making any recommendations that might prevent future shootings. PCW continues to urge the BHUAC to hold all of its meetings in public. They can then invoke an executive session if someone's medical or other such information needs to be shared.

--There is still no mention that the DOJ and the City disagree about whether Crisis Triage is fully functional in Portland (115) because of the uncertainty around the Portland Street Response (PSR) program. There is no concern from the COCL, other than saying they will "monitor" the numbers, about the fact that calls routed to PSR went down from 4110 to 2858 [p. 43], a 30% drop.

back to table of contents • back to top

SOME OFFICERS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS-- EMPLOYEE INFORMATION SHOWS LAPSES

(Note: Paragraphs 119 on flagging officers who use force three times in 30 days and 120 on adding a second Employee Information System manager were dismissed, leaving three)

As noted in our introduction, the outcomes analysis about the Employee Information System (EIS) section [pp. 52-56] shows that only six of the 17 officers with the most complaints over the course of four years received counseling.*-5 The officer with the most complaints (#1)-- 17--had five sustained (found out of policy) but received no counseling based on their repeat offenses. One other who had five out of nine complaints sustained (officer #10) also was not talked to. However, the officer with the most sustained complaints (#2), who had eight of 15 found as violations, was given a 90 day plan to change their behavior (the only officer with that outcome). And, underscoring PCW's point that not all officers are treated the same, two others who had five sustained complaints (#6 and #8, based on 11 complaints each) received coaching.

Overall, it appears 27% of all officers, or 221, received no complaints in those four years, while about one third (33%) had just one. 129 had two complaints (16%), 89 had three (11%) and 40 (5%) had four, which means this batch had fewer than one complaint per year on average. That leaves 8% of the force who had more than one annually on average: 66 had between five and 17 complaints. There is a footnote about 2020 being an outlier year because of so many complaints filed (that was the year officers used force over 6000 times at racial justice protests). However, the COCL notes that the most complained about officers had ten and six complaints in 2023 and the fifth frequent flyer had six in 2021.

Regarding the paragraphs still in Partial Compliance:

--Paragraphs 116 and 117 talk about how often the EIS is reviewed in order to identify officers or supervisors/units with unusual numbers of alerts. For a long time one reason for non-compliance was that the Force Inspector was not consistent in identifying such officers/units, the new SOP discussed above had improved that, allegedly. The COCL says the SOP provides "reference points" to help with the analysis, but doesn't give a single example [pp. 48-49]. As for PCW's concern that there have been at least seven Force Inspectors in seven years, the COCL noted at the PCCEP Town Hall that consistency is provided by the non-sworn data analysts who have been in the unit for a while. The Report should reflect that collective effort rather than personalizing the "expertise" on a position with such turnover.

---The main sticking point on these two paragraphs is whether the whole EI system needs to be assessed for effectiveness, which apparently the DOJ and the City are not in agreement about.

--Paragraph 118 setting the thresholds to identify outlier officers is still deemed in Substantial Compliance. A technical issue required supervisors to enter some information manually into the System. That said, the COCL casually notes that only 51% of officers with alerts were called in by supervisors, down from 54-76% in previous quarters, perhaps in part due to the computer issues [pp. 50-51].

back to table of contents • back to top

MORE SHENANIGANS KEEP ACCOUNTABILITY FROM COMPLIANCE

(Note: Paragraphs 130 forbidding retaliation, 134 on the size of the Citizen Review Committee [CRC], 135 on the CRC's ability to consider officers out of policy, 136 on CRC ordering more investigation, and 138/139/140 on IPR reporting were dismissed.)

Before getting into the analysis of the Accountability section, which had no outcomes review this time, PCW wants to note that there were two pending investigations into officer retaliation in Q3, yet Paragraph 130 requiring the Bureau to forbid this misconduct was dismissed in Q4. So not only does the community get no follow up on those incidents, but even if they were not handled properly the COCL and DOJ no longer have jurisdiction. This is a general concern with nearly all the dismissed paragraphs but is particularly disconcerting here.

--Another note about dismissed paragraphs: The membership of CRC (134) was down to seven people between October and May, making it difficult for them to achieve quorum.

As noted above, the big problem with Accountability in Q4 was discovering that deadly force investigations where the person subjected to deadly force is facing criminal charges were being put on hold during those criminal proceedings, in violation of the Agreement and PPB policy. The fact that this was only discovered now, over nine years into the official implementation of the Agreement, raises a lot of concerns about reliability of the DOJ and COCL's monitoring. The issues raised by this "tolling" can impact paragraph 121, which required investigations to be finished in 180 days [p. 57] and 123, which requires the Bureau to figure out why cases take so long and create a plan to fix the problems [p. 60].

Other issues among the remaining 14 paragraphs:

--The COCL suggests, regarding Paragraph 123, that the PPB look at individual stages of complaints that go past their allotted time even when the whole investigation is finished in a timely manner. PCW supports this concept [p. 60].

--The shooting of PoniaX Calles, which took place in Gresham, led to a delay in the COCL seeing that officers were given the proper communications restrictions. They were provided in Q4 (125) [p. 62].

--Despite the COCL demanding for years that the Bureau update its policy on deadly force to (retroactively) allow officers who witness deadly force to decline an interview if they are psychologically unable to do so, they upgraded Paragraph 126 to Substantial Compliance because a Standard Operating Procedure was written [p. 63]. Especially because this SOP about "mental incapacitation" is not publicly available, PCW urges that the policy still be fixed.

--The Bureau still gets a pass for not conducting walk-throughs with officers who engage in deadly force because they ask for such information, though all officers decline based on their attorney's advice (127) [p, 64].

--Paragraph 128 on not duplicating efforts between the "Independent" Police Review and police Internal Affairs also got an upgrade to Substantial Compliance because the COCL sees the IPR receiving more support from the City in Human Resources, legal, timekeeping, benefits and being able to get on the Council agenda [p. 65]. It's not really clear how these are related, and the other issues identified in Paragraph 192 leave some open questions about how fully IPR is supported.*-6

--The analysis of Paragraph 129 requiring all allegations of force to be investigated reveals a few things. One case was suspended because police reports do not show force was used, but can be reopened. Another was dismissed, they say, because body camera footage refuted the allegation [p. 66]. PCW is interested in reading about cases where body camera and third party footage supports allegations as well.

--The COCL criticizes the Police Review Board (PRB) for holding a hearing about an incident that led to a civil judgment against the city, even though the officer involved was never identified. They claim it was not "useful or objective," citing that Paragraph 133 requires the Bureau to presume misconduct when there is such a court decision [p. 67]. First of all, 133 actually allows the PRB (and PPB) to overturn a misconduct finding if there's more information in an administrative investigation that disproves the allegation, so that allows them to be "objective." Second, even when a specific officer is not held accountable, the community members on PRB need the experience to review cases, and the full Board can recommend important policy changes, so it is "useful" as well.

--Side note: The review of paragraph 133 says there were no findings of civil liability in Q4 [pp. 68-69]. Presumably, the case that led to the Police Review Board hearing happened earlier. That should be made clear.

--Portland Copwatch still believes that the PRB's ability to send cases back for more investigation should be included in City Code, not just in the Bureau policy, but Paragraph 132 is still found in Substantial Compliance [p. 68].

--As the Bureau continues to drag their heels updating the Directive about the Discipline Guide (now called the "Corrective Action Guide"), Paragraph 137 is still only partially in compliance. The current guide was adopted, as the COCL points out, in February 2022 [p,. 69]. Interestingly the Report reveals that out of eight suggested forms of "corrective action," four officers resigned before receiving discipline.

--All of the paragraphs identified by the COCL (and, we hope, the other concerns raised by PCW) led to a Partial Complaince rating for Paragraph 169, which requires the accountability system to function properly and hold officers to account [p. 71]. They list one case handled as a Supervisory Investigation where the COCL disagreed with a commander finding the officer used proper confrontation management skills.

back to table of contents • back to top

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: JUST GETTING BY GETS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RATING

(Note: Paragraphs 145 requiring Bureau public engagement, 146 on creating an outreach plan, 147 on publishing precinct demographic data, and 149 on metrics for evaluating the community engagement plan were dismissed)

It is likely that nobody who lives in the City of Portland would say that there's a high point in community-police relations in 2024. Yet the entire section of the Settlement Agreement on Community Engagement continues to be found in Substantial Compliance.

As noted in the intro, the COCL does not conduct outcomes analysis about the disproportionate racial impact of traffic stop data published as part of Paragraph 148 [pp. 75-76]. This issue is far too important for outside monitors to simply recommend ongoing dialogue. Instead, the numbers should be leading to changes in policy and bringing those stops more into proportion.

As for some of the other seven paragraphs that remain in this section:

--The Portland Committee on Community Engaged Policing previously joined the COCL and Training Advisory Council in recommending surveys of people who have contact with police. The Mayor approved that recommendation in Q1 2024 (on January 2). The COCL reports that a work group is being formed that includes the PCCEP, TAC, the Bureau, Community Safety Division, the City Attorney and... the two police Collective Bargaining Units (Portland Police Association and Portland Police Commanding Officers Association) to find a vendor (142) [pp. 72-73]. It does not make sense to allow the people who can use force up to and including taking people's lives to gum up the works in finding objective reviews of their actions.

--The PCCEP still has one youth seat open, a recurring problem which the COCL recommends fixing even though the persistent issue isn't pulling the City out of compliance (143) [pp. 73-74].

--The City is found to be adequately supporting the 13-member PCCEP even though they only have a total of 1.75 support staff -- made up of one full time and three part-time employees (144) [p. 74]. This is not adequate.

---Side note from Portland Copwatch: The PCCEP is meant to be a community-driven committee, yet the staff frequently hosts and facilitates all the meetings, even when they have contracted facilitators present. The work still gets done but the optics are that the community members are not in charge.

--As PCW has been saying for years, just because the City holds meetings in each precinct to discuss the Bureau's annual report doesn't mean that Paragraph 150 is in full compliance [pp. 77- 78]. There are numerous aspects that are supposed to be addressed in those meetings, including the issue of stops data, which are skimmed over at best, and there is paltry outreach to the community. The Bureau has dozens of advisory bodies which could all send out information about the Annual Report to improve attendance and input. Furthermore, the Chief's required presentation to City Council does not include any feedback heard from the public, though fortunately Council now allows public testimony at those hearings. (These comments also apply to Paragraph 193.)

back to table of contents • back to top

OTHER REMEDIES: MORE OF A GUIDELINE THAN A RULE

The four sections in the "Other Remedies" section that was added in 2022 which are still not found in compliance are:

__Paragraph 189 requiring outside review of the 2020 protests and revised training and policies [pp. 80-81]

The Independent Monitor, LLC (IMLLC) group presented its report to the City in Q3, which helped inform the "needs assessment" for training in Q4. The City issued its required self- assessment in 2024 so that is not covered here. The IMLLC has to come back again to assess the actual progress sometime later this year. Though PCW still has concerns about referring to police helping other police as "mutual aid," the COCL reports the City has forged new agreements with Multnomah County and Gresham. It is our understanding that these agencies are coming in to take on regular policing duties while the PPB responds to crowd control events.*-7

__Paragraph 192 requiring IPR to investigate supervisor actions during the 2020 protests [pp. 83- 84]

Addressed in the intro, these investigations into incidents that took place nearly four years ago are far past the 180 day timeline required in Paragraph 121. Sure, they are open investigations and there should be no comment on the _content_, but at least someone could report whether there are officers/supervisors who went on leave, evidence that is hard to come by, or some other reason it is taking so long. By the time this is resolved most of the "suspects" will have retired.

__Paragraph 194 requiring the Bureau to equip officers with Body Worn Cameras [pp. 85-86]

The COCL notes that the evaluation of the Bureau's pilot project was done by interviewing officers, but makes no note that the community was not asked for feedback. They do recommend coming up with a framework to conduct ongoing evaluation, and PCW strongly suggests the community be involved in that process.

__Paragraph 195 requiring the City to establish the oversight system set in the City Charter [pp. 87-88]

As noted in the introduction, the City is still negotiating with the Portland Police Association (PPA) about implementing the new oversight system. The COCL's report leaves out some salient points about what occurred in Q4: After the City Attorney presented its watered-down version of the Police Accountability Commission's proposal for the new system, members of the PAC demanded time to discuss the content of the City's plan. The City held one meeting that was poorly facilitated, and although a number of questions were never addressed, they plowed forward stating they were on a tight timeline. That was five months ago, and there is no resolution with the PPA. Furthermore, in Q1 the PPA filed a ballot initiative to overturn the Charter policies, which is, as we're writing this analysis, still held up in court. As noted in other documents, the PPA did not object to Paragraph 195 when it was adopted by the Court in 2022. And for their part, the City of Portland seems to have done some verbal gymnastics to interpret the Charter's required budget as equivalent to 5% of the Bureau's "operating budget" to mean 5% of the budget _only for their Operations Branch.__ The result is a budget that is $2.5 million, 20% of what it would be if it were 5% (about $12.5 million) of the Bureau's overall budget (about $250 million).

Shenanigans!

back to table of contents • back to top

CONCLUSION

As the Compliance Officer's purview over the Settlement Agreement is coming to an end, PCW continues to appreciate the pieces of information they provide which community members should find alarming, and which are not really noted anywhere else. That said, it's disappointing that the Monitor, like the COCL, is not locally based, meaning that many of the nuances of what is working and what needs fixing will continue to get lost in translation. We hope that the Monitor taking over for the DOJ as the body that determines compliance will take their role seriously, ensure the city's "self-monitoring" is not just self-congratulatory back-slapping, and will seriously consider community input.

back to table of contents • back to top

APPENDIX: Dismissed and "Self- Monitoring" Paragraphs

The 40 paragraphs that were dismissed and thus not covered in the Report are:
(Force) 68, 71 (Training) 80, 82, 83, (Mental Health) 87, (Crisis Intervention) 91, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, (Employee Information) 119, 120, (Accountability) 130,
134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, (Community Engagement) 145, 146, 147, 149

These are the 15 paragraphs the City is supposed to now be self-monitoring:

(Mental Health) 88, 89, 90, (Crisis Intervention) 94, 95, 96, (Community Engagement) 141, 142, 143, 144, 151, 152, 148, 150, (Other Remedies)193

---------

back to table of contents • back to top

Footnotes

*1- Find the Report at https://www.portland.gov/pccep/documents/q4-2023-draft-cocl-report-document/download

Back to text

*2- https://www.portlandcocl.com/s/Compliance-and-Outcome-Assessment-Report-2023-Quarter- 3-Updates-and-Analysis-Final.pdf

Back to text

*3- Matthew Holland and Richard Perez, say their names.

Back to text

*4- https://www.portlandcocl.com/s/Compliance-and-Outcome-Assessment-Report-2023-Quarter- 2-Updates-and-Analysis-Final.pdf
pages 87-88

Back to text

*5- The table shows six even though the COCL says there were seven.

Back to text

*6- This is not to mention that IPR's monthly reports to the Citizen Review Committee are inadequate and glossed over, their annual reports continue to be published late and with minimal content, and transparency is erratic.

Back to text

*7- We appreciate the COCL using "crowd control events" and not "Public Order events" which still seems Orwellean.

Back to text

back to table of contents • back to top

Posted May 14, 2024, updated with links May 16, 2024